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3
Synopsis
There are many reasons why environmental policies are subject to imperfections. For exam-
ple, the marginal benefit and cost of pollution may be unsure, so that the optimal degree of
pollution is uncertain (Weitzman 1974). In this dissertation, the imperfections stem from,
on the one hand, disregarded reactions of third parties to environmental policies and, on the
other hand, influences of lobby groups on policies. It comprises four research papers:
1. ‘Unilateral Climate Policy: Harmful or even Disastrous?’ (with Hendrik Ritter)
2. ‘Unilateral Supply Side Policies and the Green Paradox’
3. ‘Lobbying over Exhaustible-Resource Extraction’ (with Achim Voss)
4. ‘Special Interest Politics: Contribution Schedules versus Nash Bargaining’ (with Achim
Voss)
The first and the second research papers analyze under which conditions certain envi-
ronmental policies lead to the so called green paradox, meaning that they do more harm
than good to the environment (Sinn 2008). Here, the reason for possible ineffectiveness is
the reaction of indirectly affected players, i.e. exhaustible resource owners, to a unilateral
policy. Essay three investigates how a welfare-maximizing extraction path is altered due to
lobbying by exhaustible resource owners. Here, the reason for inefficiency is the influence of
directly affected players on the policy. The forth research paper is a technical extension of the
third. It demonstrates that the policy with lobbing is the same in the contribution-schedules
equilibrium as in the Nash bargaining solution whereas payments and utilities differ.
The commonalities between essay one, two and three are that they deal with imperfect
environmental policies and include exhaustible resource owners facing marginal extraction
costs which are increasing in current and cumulative supplies. All four research papers use
microeconomic theory to analyze the behavior of the involved agents in response to certain
policies. While essay one and two apply general equilibrium models with two periods and
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three players, the models in essay three and four are partial equilibrium, the former with n
periods and two players, the latter with one period and n players. The policy instrument
in the first research paper is to tighten an emissions cap, in the second to purchase (and
preserve) additional deposits, and in the third to set extraction quantities or, equivalently,
extraction taxes. In the forth research paper, there is a continuum of unspecified policies.
Essay one and two investigate under which conditions certain environmental policies lead
to an increase in early emissions, the so called weak green paradox, and to an increase in total
emissions damages, the so called strong green paradox (Gerlagh 2011). The latter occurs,
e.g., if early and total emissions increase or if early (total) emissions increase and total (early)
emissions stay constant. Both research papers consider demand side (unconstrained fossil
fuel consumer) and supply side (fossil fuel extractor) reactions to unilateral environmental
policies. They consider relative price effects by applying general equilibrium models and
endogenize cumulative extractions by assuming stock-dependent marginal extraction costs.
With this kind of model, an increase in total emissions due to unilateral environmental
policies is possible.
Our model is based on Eichner & Pethig’s (2011) model without extraction costs. As
far as I know, only essay one and two, van der Meijden et al. (2015) and van der Ploeg
(2016) use general equilibrium models with stock-dependent marginal extraction costs in the
green paradox literature. However, essay two is the only one from these research papers that
considers carbon supply reducing policies (cf. Harstad 2012, Hoel 2014).
The main results of essay one are as follows: If the abating country tightens its emissions
cap in the first of the two periods, present emissions in the non-abating country increase
because the present fossil fuel price declines relative to the present commodity price (carbon
leakage). Total emissions in the first period increase if the intertemporal elasticity of substi-
tution in consumption is low and the user cost of extraction is high (weak green paradox ).
Depending on the price elasticities of demand and supply for fossil fuel, an increase in present
emissions can coincide with an increase in cumulative emissions (strong green paradox ). If
the emissions cap is tightened in the second period, the green paradoxes occur under some-
what opposite conditions. However, cumulative emissions in the non-abating country can
also decline (negative cumulative carbon leakage).
In essay two, I demonstrate that the qualitative results concerning the green paradoxes
are quite similar when the policy instrument is changed from tightening an emissions cap to
purchasing (and preserving) additional deposits. Moreover, I derive conditions under which
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it is more effective first to purchase the lowest-cost deposits and then to purchase additional
high-cost deposits, something that has not been derived in the literature so far.
Essay three investigates how extraction and contribution payments develop over time
if there is lobbying by exhaustible resource owners. The government has a mixed mo-
tivation of intertemporal welfare-maximization and contribution payments (Grossman &
Helpman 1994). We apply a Nash bargaining model, so that both agents benefit from the
cooperative solution. How much they benefit depends on their exogenous bargaining powers
and endogenous disagreement utilities. The agents negotiate in each period and assume that
they cooperate forever. However, the noncooperative solution is important for the disagree-
ment utilities. Here we assume that if negotiations fail once, the agents leave the bargaining
table forever (Petrosyan 1997). Then, the lobby group pays nothing and the government
maximizes intertemporal welfare.
Our model combines lobbying in the tradition of Grossman & Helpman (1994), dynamic
(Nash) bargaining and (exhaustible) resource extraction with stock-dependent costs as well
as stock-pollution damages. Similar models in the literature are those from Barbier et al.
(2005), Boyce (2010) and Andrés-Domenech et al. (2015). Different to these models, we
include monopoly rents and flow-pollution damages in our analysis.
The main results are as follows: In the cooperative solution, extraction is a compromise
between welfare- and profit-maximization. How strong the influence of the lobby group on
the policy is does not depend on the bargaining powers but on the relative valuation of the
contribution payments: The more the government cares for contribution payments and the
less the lobby group must spend to collect them, the stronger is the influence of the lobby
group. The development of contribution payments reflects the conflict of interest between
the agents: If the preferred extraction quantities differ widely, contribution payments are
high, and vice versa. In the long run, when marginal extraction costs become prohibitively
high, the preferred extraction quantities of both agents become zero, so that the conflict of
interest and thus the contribution payments vanish. Because of stock-pollution damages,
the preferred cumulative extraction quantity of the government is reached before extraction
stops. When it is reached, contribution payments jump up because the disagreement utility
of the exhaustible resource owners deteriorates, so that their willingness to pay increases
sharply.
In what follows, the abstracts, co-authorships, conference presentations and scientific
disseminations of the four research papers are presented in tabular form.
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Publication Ritter, Hendrik & Mark Schopf (2014), ‘Unilateral Climate Policy: Harm-
ful or even Disastrous?’, Environmental and Resource Economics 58(1),
155–178.
Abstract This paper deals with possible foreign reactions to unilateral carbon de-
mand reducing policies. It differentiates between demand side and sup-
ply side reactions as well as between intra- and intertemporal shifts in
greenhouse gas emissions. In our model, we integrate a stock-dependent
marginal physical cost of extracting fossil fuels into Eichner & Pethig’s
(2011) general equilibrium carbon leakage model. The results are as fol-
lows: Under similar but somewhat tighter conditions than those derived
by Eichner & Pethig (2011), a weak green paradox arises. Furthermore,
a strong green paradox can arise in our model under supplementary con-
straints. That means a “green” policy measure might not only lead to a
harmful acceleration of fossil fuel extraction but to an increase in the cu-
mulative climate damages at the same time. In some of these cases there
is even a cumulative extraction expansion, which we consider disastrous.
Co-authorship Research idea and introduction mainly by Hendrik Ritter.
Model jointly developed by Hendrik Ritter and Mark Schopf.
Calculations, body and conclusion mainly by Mark Schopf.
Conference
Presentations
Mannheim Energy Conference, Mannheim, June 2012.
Annual Conference of the European Association of Environmental and
Resource Economists, Prague, June 2012.
Annual Congress of the International Institute of Public Finance, Dres-
den, August 2012.
Scientific
Dissemination
The work on this paper started in June 2011 and reached the status
of a working paper in May 2012 under the title ‘Reassessing the Green
Paradox’. It was submitted to Environmental and Resource Economics
in May 2012 and revised and resubmitted in March 2013 and June 2013.
It was accepted for publication in June 2013, published ahead of print in
July 2013 and published in print in May 2014.
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Publication Mark Schopf (2016), ‘Unilateral Supply Side Policies and the Green Para-
dox’, UPB Dissertation Working Paper No. 28.
Abstract This paper deals with possible foreign reactions to unilateral carbon sup-
ply reducing policies. It differentiates between demand and supply side
reactions as well as between intra- and intertemporal shifts of greenhouse
gas emissions. Ritter & Schopf (2014) integrate stock-dependent marginal
physical extraction costs into Eichner & Pethig’s (2011) general equi-
librium carbon leakage model. Using this model, we change the policy
instrument from an emissions trading scheme to a deposit preserving sys-
tem. The results are as follows: Under similar conditions than those de-
rived by Ritter & Schopf (2014), the weak green paradox and the strong
green paradox arise. In case of acting today, these conditions are tight-
ened due to the energy market channel of carbon leakage. In case of acting
tomorrow, the change in the physical user cost of extraction additionally
influences the effectiveness of the carbon supply reducing policies. In both
cases, it can be more effective to preserve the deposits with the lowest
marginal physical extraction costs first.
Conference
Presentations
International Energy Workshop, Paris, June 2013.
International Association of Energy Economists European Conference,
Düsseldorf, August 2013.
European Economic Association Annual Congress, Gothenburg, August
2013.
Scientific
Dissemination
The work on this paper started in January 2013 and reached the status
of a working paper in June 2013 under the title ‘Preserving Eastern or
Offshore Oil for Preventing Green Paradoxes?’. It was thoroughly revised
from January 2016 to April 2016.
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Publication Voss, Achim & Mark Schopf (2016), ‘Lobbying over Exhaustible-Resource
Extraction’, UPB Dissertation Working Paper No. 26.
Abstract Consider a lobby group of exhaustible-resource suppliers, which bargains
with the government over the extraction of an exhaustible resource and
over contribution payments. We characterize the equilibrium extraction
path and the development of contribution payments in time. The lat-
ter relates to the development of the conflict of interest between profit-
maximization and welfare-maximization. Due to stock pollution dam-
ages, the government prefers a lower level of cumulative extraction than
the lobby group in the long run. In the meantime, the resource suppliers’
aim to maximize profits implies that equilibrium extraction may be too
slow to maximize welfare, while flow-pollution damages imply that it may
be too fast.
Co-authorship Research idea and model jointly developed by Achim Voss and Mark
Schopf.
Calculations and writing in equal parts by Achim Voss and Mark Schopf.
Conference
Presentations
Nachwuchsworkshop Umwelt- und Ressourcenökonomie, Kiel, February
2014.
Conference on Sustainable Resource Use and Economic Dynamics, As-
cona, June 2014.
World Congress of Environmental and Resource Economists, Istanbul,
June 2014.
Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik, Münster, September 2015.
Research Seminar on Environmental, Resource and Climate Economics,
Berlin, November 2015.
Scientific
Dissemination
The work on this paper started in July 2013. A previous version was
published in January 2014 as part of the dissertation ‘Essays in Environ-
mental Policy and Political Economy’ from Achim Voss. It was submitted
to the International Economic Review in June 2015 and is currently under
revise and resubmit.
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Publication Voss, Achim & Mark Schopf (2016), ‘Special Interest Politics: Contribu-
tion Schedules versus Nash Bargaining’, UPB Dissertation Working Paper
No. 27.
Abstract The article compares two models of lobby influence on policy choice: The
Grossman & Helpman (1994) contribution-schedule model and a negoti-
ation between the lobbies and the government summarized by a Nash-
bargaining function. The literature uses the models interchangeably be-
cause they imply the same equilibrium policy. We derive under which
conditions they lead to the same payments, equilibrium utilities, and total
efficiency. They coincide under particular assumptions about bargaining
power and disagreement utility.
Co-authorship Research idea and model jointly developed by Achim Voss and Mark
Schopf.
Calculations and writing in equal parts by Achim Voss and Mark Schopf.
Scientific
Dissemination
The work on this paper started in December 2015 and reached the status
of a working paper in February 2016. It was submitted to the Journal of
International Economics in March 2016 and is currently under review.
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